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INTRODUCTION 
The history of humanity has been 
closely associated with the sea. Even 
disregarding the theory that attributes 
the birth of organic life to that salty 
environment, one cannot deny that 
through the blue and green expanses of 
water, different streams of civilizations 
marked the road of history along the 
centuries. But man's primary interest in 
the oeean has been as a means of 
transportation or communication. 
Scientific know lege of the sea began 
as recently as a century ago ("Chal-
lenger" expedition, 1872-76). After 
such a relatively recent start, interest in 
the importance of the oceans grew 
greatly as funds were invested in better 
knowledge of them. That is particularly 
true among the main world powers. 
Though exploration gave varied results, 
increased knowledge raised new qucs· 
tions and indicatcd newer and hcavicr 
demands. Later, a real tridimensional 
scientific scope posed new challenges, as 
indicated by recent views of the oceans 
as a "world granary. " 
Advances in outer and inner space 
(or hydrosphere) are closely related to 
scientific and technological progress. 
Also, both involve difficult operational 
environments. They both require careful 
planning. Inefficiencies and errors are 
not tol!:rateu. Research is very expen· 
sive. Sophisticated instrumentation is 
needed. Also, both require highly quali. 
fied personnel on a eomparatively large 
scale of the total of persons employed. 
The conquest of both spaces began 
after the "population explosion" was 
noted. This latter phenomenon added 
an increasing amount of tensions all 
over the world. The need for vital space 
and the search for supremacy in the 
world opened areas for friction or major 
disputes in this tense world. Countries 
with the most advanced operational 
know· how an~ in the hetlt position for 
achieving slIecm,:s. I t is not surprising, 
thcn, to find reasons to conquer new 
environments other than the reasons of 
humanitarian wit'h('s for more food. 
mon: space, and waLcr for (!vcry human 
Iwing or Lh(' inLcllcr.Lual rcasons in 
sean'h of :>cienLifie knowledgc. 
Five·seveIlLlu; of Lhc world's :>nrface 
is ('(lv('red hy the oceans. III charaeLl'r, 
Lwo OCl'an environmenLs can be di:;Lin-
gui~hcd. One is that eXLension of the 
mainland sloping under waLer to a rela-
Lively abrupl ehange in hoLLom slope; 
Lhe oLher eXLends heyond Lhal hOlln-
rlury and cncolII pasges the larger und 
ahys:,al oc('uni(' (It'pLhs. The first urea is 
Lhl' COlllillt'nLul Shdf; Lhl' laLLer is Lhe 
lwlngir 100m'. 
(l I' thl'';l' two. hl'CnUl'I' of th(' II'SSl'r 
(It-pth::; ulld nl'nrlll'SS to till' eonst, the 
Con Lim'n Lal Sht:! f will hI! increasingly 
imporLant. The open seas will conLinue 
to hI' primary areas for oecan transpor-
LaLion of goods hclwecn conLincnLs and, 
Lherefore, areas of military dispuLe for 
Lheir protccLion. 
The discussion of factors affecting 
thc Conlinental Shdf and c1ucidation of 
its imporLance from a straLegic view-
poinL arc the main pnrposes of this 
rrsrarch. In Ihr pfl~s(ml world, strategy 
('m),ral'I's sl'vernl :ISPI'ds that iuvolve tIll: 
proj,'('lion of (,fforl,; from fil'ltfs ap-
pnn'ntly tliscounl'I'lt'ti from till' ,;pceifi,' 
military onl'. 111'111'1', (I!II' Ilisl'ul','lion will 
IHlVIl to ('(lVI~r sl'VI'r:ll an'as othl~r Ihml 
that of our primary concern prior to 
any allcmpl to draw conclusions. 
I-THE CONTINENTAL SHELVES: 
THEIR PHYSICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
The advent of modern devices of 
!>()unding permitted a beLter understand-
ing of the sea relief in this cenLury with 
the introducLion of echo sounds. WiLh 
Ihrsc means, helter than ever before, il 
was sern lhaL when approaching Lhe 
rllm,ls frolll the deep sea an area of 
rnpidly dl'crcusing depths and a follow-
inl! l'omparntl\'e1y fluL hoLLom preceded 
Ihl' inllnedillll! lll'lIl'h or rOllsllinc. TIll! 
11ILLl'r naL area was mcnLioned in 1887 
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hy II ugh R, :\ Till us thr Con tincnlul 
Shdf. 1 The ahrupt lransition of deplhs 
is the arell named Continenlul Slope; ils 
inner limit is about the 100-fathom or 
200-meter isohath. 
The Inll:rnllLionlll I1ydrogr:lphic 
Bureau, throllgh iLs I nternaLional Com-
miLLee on the Nomenclature of Ocean 
Bottom Features (22 Septemher 1952), 
defines the Continental Shelf as the 
1o0ne hordl:ring eonlinents from the low 
wlllerline to a depth at which a rela-
tiv('I), Stl'l'P slope tow:lrds thc drep 
regions is fouud. It locates thal sharprr 
in(Tral-'e in d('pth around 100 faLhoms 
or ~OO metl'rs hut rt'l'()~nizl's thaI il ean 
ol'cur at mon' than ~O(} or II':<s than h!l 
falhoms. ) L also r(:cogni1ocs llll: l~lInlincn­
lal borderland where the marginal area 
is irregular and has much larger depths 
than those mentioned for a Continental 
Shelf.2 
The Continental Shelf was found to 
vary in width and depth in different 
areas of the world, but it shows some 
limiLed confined rangl! of variation. 
Also, shores of YOllng e1evaled moun-
lainolls regions havI~ a narrow shelf or 
lal'l;, it. Thosl: cliffl!rl:llt~cs makl~ il diffi-
('lilt to ('slahlish an :le('urall~ lIud cllln-
pn'lwnsin: ddiuilion of Ihl' lJIorphu-
lo~iealph"n()u\enou. 
TIll: area significance of the Con-
lincnLal Shelves' is ilulieated hy the facl 
that they represent 7.6 pcrcent of the 
total ocean surface,3 or about 20 per-
cent of all the continental land masses 
(excluding Antarctica).4 
The area dimension of the Conti-
nental Shelves, compared to the conti-
nental land, varies for various regions as 
follows: 5 
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Accordingly, some specific areas have 
very extensive Continental Shelves, i.e., 
Java, Sumatra, Malacca, Bornco, south 
of Bering Strait, east of Siberia, Austra-
lia, Guinea, east of Argentina, Korea, 
and the North Sea.6 Other areas lack 
the Continental Shelf, like Chile and 
Peru, though Biroe mentions that often 
there is a Continental Shelf about 20 
kilometers wide in a transitional zone 
from the submarine bottom to the aerial 
relief off the mountainous coasts. 
A comparison of sources shows dif-
ferent estimates of the dimension of 
shelves. To illustrate, Shepard,8 Kue-
nen,9 and Carsey I 0 indicate that the 
maximum width reaches to 800 miles, 
the average width is about 42 miles, the 
average depth is of 72 fathoms but may 
reach 270 fathoms, and the average 
slope of the Continental Shelf is about 
0°07'. The slope mentioned is not uni-
form, the inner half of the shelf heing 
steeper than the outer shelf. The flat-
ness of the shelf or its uniform slope is a 
general description since hollows and 
hills of 20 meters and larger are fre-
quently observed. 
The predominant sediment of Conti-
nental Shelves is sand. Pebbles, cobbles, 
and rock bottoms are also common in 
the outer parts. The proximity to large 
rivers is shown by a change of the 
predominant sediment towards mud. I r-
Studies on the geological structure have 
shown unconsolidated sediment over-
lying wedges of semi consolidated sedi-
ment.12 In some of those Continental 
Shelves the layer of sediment could be 
as much as 6 to 12 kilometers. I 3 
The formation of Continental 
Shelves is not clearly understood so far, 
although various theories have becn 
advanced. Some investigators support a 
depositional origin, but others think 
wave erosion played a major role. Also, 
there arc supporters of the theory that 
hoth processcs could have acted to-
gether. 14 Geophysical studies showed 
the origin of shelvcs have not been the 
same everywhere. For example, the 
subsidence of sedinwnts formed the 
shelf off the eastern U.S. coast. I 5 The 
lowering of the sca Icvcl during glacial 
periods is of particular importance to 
the possible development of shelves, hut 
there is a broad divergence of opinion 
regarding the estimation of maximum 
sea lowering in the Pleistocene era.16 
Research on submarinc canyons could 
be useful for a better explanation of the 
phenomenon. 17 
Waters covering the Continental 
Shelves arc differentiated from the 
waters heyond at greater dl~pthH. Thes(: 
waters represent a hiological provincc-
the neritic-in the habitats of marine 
life.18 Dilution, contamination by terri-
genous sediments, penetration of natu-
ral light, and ease of development of a 
nutrition chain give specific character to 
the Continental Shelves. I 9 
Influencing transmission of light in 
the sea, material in suspension plays an 
important role. Coastal waters can be so 
densely contaminated with suspended 
material that almost 50 percent of the 
total light intensity received on the 
surface can be absorbed in a meter 
helow the sea level. The reflectivity of 
the suspended partieles also affeels the-
waters, altering their color. It is not 
!>trange, tlwn, to see that from the d!'ep 
hlue of the "oceanic desert" the color 
changes in the marginal areas of the 
shelves to a greenish blue or a green or 
at times to shades of gray, brown, red, 
or yellow. 2 0 
The proximity of nutrients-phos-
phates, nitrates, and nitrites-to the 
euphotic area and the more favorable 
conditions for vertical movements in the 
water masses account for a rich coastal 
life.21 Therefore, the Continental 
Shelves are fertile areas for productive 
fishing or abundant animal life and arc 
more valuahle in thi!> respect than the 
deeper oceans. TIH~ influent'(' of that 
environment is not confined only to the 
geographical limits of the shelves them-
selves. 
II-CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE: 
LEGAL TRENDS REGARDING 
CONTINENTAL SHELVES 
International legislation of sover-
eignly of a coastal state's marginal 
waters was born, probably, as a need for 
safety. Whcn limitation was first 
thought of, naval guns of short range 
were the only possible threat to land 
from offshore waters. The only extrac-
tive aClivities were fishing and the 
search for valuable raw materials. Other 
than these, exploitation, was not practi-
cal. Wilhin this century the laying of 
submarine cables and development of 
offshore oil extraction created needs for 
a new definition of sovercignty. How-
evcr, no definite declaralion was made 
previous to the 1940's regarding na-
tional rights to resources on Continental 
Shelves. 
The first specific precedent goes hack 
to 26 February 1942 with the bilateral 
treaty between the United Kingdom and 
Venezuela regarding exploitation of sub-
marine oilfields in the Gulf of Paria.1 A 
major evenl was the proclamation of the 
United Slates by President Truman on 
23 September 1945 reserving for the 
Uniled States, sovereignty on the seabed 
and subsoil resources of the Continental 
Shclf offshore to a depth of 100 fa-
thoms.2 Though there had been an 
earlier international act (2 September 
1947), the declaration of the Inter-
American Defense Zone considered 
more than the Continental Shelf area 
and was restricted to defense purposes.3 
No claim was made, at that time, of 
economic implication, but Truman's 
proclamation aroused a series of later 
declarations of similar nature. 
Differences in declarations on sover-
eignty on Continental Shclves arc noted 
as follows: (a) the maximum dcpth to 
which the claim was made, (b) the 
nature of thc area. For examplc, on 29 
October 1945, Mexico reserved all 
natural riches of the adjacent Continen-
tal Shelf delimited by the 200-meter 
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isobath.4 Argentina, on 9 October 
1946, declared sovereignty over the 
Argentine epicontinental sea and Conti-
nental Shelf but previously (24 January 
1944) had declared those areas to be 
zones of mineral reserves.s Costa Rica 
and Honduras, on different dates, refer 
to the submarine platform with no 
indication of depth. Other nations fol-
lowed: for example, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia on 29 May 1949 extended 
claims to areas in the Persian Gulf 
contiguous to its coasts. A 19 May 1949 
Iranian Bill refcrs to the Continental 
Shclf without indicating a depth.6 
Brazil, on 8 November 1950, established 
hcr exclusive jurisdiction over the natu-
ral resources of the Continental Shclf as 
well as for fishing in that area, differing 
from Argentina only in the method.7 
The growing importance of fishing 
operations led some countries to new 
declarations of sovereignty of the watcrs 
up to limits of 200 miles Qffshor.t7 but 
without restraining freedom, of naviga-
tion by ships of other nations. Countries 
without Continental Shelves made re-
latcd claims. For example, Chile and 
Peru made proclamations on 25 June 
1947 and 1 August 1947, respeetively.s 
In the midst of those and other 
claims, and undcr the prcssure of new 
marine technologieal advances, lhe 
United Nations celebrated the Interna-
tional Law Commission meetings of 
1951, 1953, 19569 and the Geneva 
Convention of the Continental Shelf of 
1958.10 Draft articles were prepared 
with some changes which gave the 
scheme of the Geneva Convention of 
1958, currently the latest international 
codification on the Continental Shelf. 11 
In that conference a legal definition 
of the shelf was established, and rights 
of the coastal states were defined. Re-
garding the definition, the criterion has 
been to leave a flexible margin of 
adjustment to technological develop-
ments that is to interpret the Continen-
tal Shclf as the submarine bottom to 
200 meters or beyond that limit if 
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exploitation of natural resources was 
feasible (article 1). In defined areas, the 
right of exploitation by the coastal 
states is exclusive, but sovereignty ap-
plies only to exploring and exploiting 
natural resources (article 2.1). The eon-
vention clearly defines the term "natu-
ral resources" as those minerals, non-
living resources of the seabed and sub-
soil, as well as the living animals that at 
the harvestable stage are immobile or 
under the seahed or move in constant 
physical contact with the bottom or 
subsoil (article 2.4). The idea of sover-
eignty does not imply the superjacent 
waters, where the concept of freedom 
of the seas prevails (article 3). Also, no 
coastal state may impede another na-
tion's laying of submarine cables or 
pipelines across its Continental Shelf 
(article 4). The exclusive right to ex-
ploitation does not interfere with 
oceanographic or scientific research by 
other parties whenever those are done 
with the intention of open puhlication 
(article 5.1). A safety zone of only 
500-meter radius around structures 
erected for exploitation purposes is al-
lowed. Those structures arc not to be 
put up in disregard of the needs of 
navigating international sealancs (article 
5.2, 5.3). The codification explicitly 
indicates that the opportunity for re-
search by the coastal slate is necessary 
(article 5.8). 
In spite of its remarkable achieve-
ment, the Geneva codification offers 
broad areas of potential disagreement. 
The first of them is the delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf. Other questions 
include: What is an unjustifiable inter-
ference? What are essential sealanes to 
. . I . . 712 mternahona naVIgatIOn. 
The eonvention failed to provide for 
compulsory settlement of disputes, thus 
settlement is left to the states them-
selves. The majority of the participants 
opposed mandatory use of the Interna-
tional Court of J usticc or other' sug-
gested means of settlement.13 
The convention of Geneva came into 
force on 10 June 1964 (article 1I.1).14 
After June 1969 a revision is possible on 
the request of the signing countries 
(article 13.1). 
In recent years, legislation and peace-
ful use of the ocean floors have become 
the concerns of several countries repre-
sented in the United Nations.1 S Since 
new ideas on those matters are con-
nected with the use of Continental 
Shelves, it is desirable to mention pos-
sible legal trends. We can distinguish the 
foIl owing possible attitudes: (a) to call a 
new United Nations convention, (b) to 
adopt the "wait and see" position ex-
pecting that conflicts will show future 
courses of action, (c) the "national 
lake" attitude, and (d) the "flag state 
approach.,,16 Thosc policies have been 
discussed relating to the high seas. But, 
so far, the limit of the Continental Shelf 
has been flexibly defined. Therefore, a 
redefinition of the outer limit of the 
Continental Shelf is involved in diseus-
sion of the high seas legal status. 
There is disagreement among nations 
rcgurding the status of the high seas 
beyond the Continental Slu,lf and oV!'r 
it. I·'or the Continental Shdf, (~xploiln­
tion of defincd resources is n rel~ogllized 
national right. For the high seas, some 
less powerful states desire instruments 
of international control. The exlenl of 
territorial waters is not agrt:ed upon. 
Interests of different states are in con-
flict. The hig powcrs, like the Uniled 
States, prefer (under the principle of 
freedom of the seas) to retain a concept 
of narrow territorial seas (equal to or 
less than 12 miles, preferably 3 miles) to 
restrain exclusive fishiny rights to a 
narrow fringe (12 miles), 7 and to have 
the United Nations redefine the rights 
of countries to the Continental Shelves, 
not yoing beyond the 200-meter 
depth. 8 Small powers, such as some of 
the Lutin American countries, tried to 
extend their Sov(~rt!ip;nty, noL ollly tn 
the soil and subsoil of their Conlinental 
Shclves, but also to waters as far as the 
extent of the shelf or even to a fixed 
large distance offshore, invoking the 
principle of conservation of resources 
(fisheries included) and economic de-
velopment.19 
The latest concern regarding the use 
of the seabed in the United Nations 
meetings refleets a division in opinion 
between the two major world powers 
and the smaller countries. These con-
cerns are in thc sphere of the security 
field. Developing countries feel that that 
poliey must be established to prevent 
the growth of a new colonialism. The 
major powers emphasize military dif-
fcrences. The United States advocates 
prohibition of emplacement of weapons 
of mass destruction on the seabed and 
deep ocean floor. The U.S.S.R. wants 
use of the seabed beyond the territorial 
waters to be reserved only for peaceful 
purposes.20 
A proposAl made by the Ambassador 
of Malta to the United Nations, Mr. A. 
Pardo, tried to solve the problem of the 
seabed and deep ocean floors through 
international juridical mechanisms.2 1 
III-ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF 
CONTINENTAL SELVES: 
CURRENT POSSII3ILITIES AND 
IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONAL OR 
WORLDWIDE ECONOMY 
The resources of the sea have been 
heavily emphasized in the last decade. 
1\10st of the frequently listed "marine 
riehes" exist on all Continental Shelves. 
Comparing possibilities with the deep 
oceans, the shelves have the advantages 
of shallower depths than the depths of 
the sea and of nearness to populated 
areas. 
One way to judge the economic value 
of sea resources could be through the 
estimated $9 billion worth of ocean 
aetivities which took place in 1963. This 
amount is estimated to increase by 8 to 
l!i percent yearly. I f WI' analyze thoge: 
figures for tlw current vnluc of diffl:rcnt 
resources, we observc that fishing, 
petrolcum exploitation, mining and 
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mineral extraction, and seaweed farming 
are the most significant. 1 Also, heavy 
government expenses in research for 
defense purposes reveals the double 
importance of the marine environment. 
From the items previously men-
tioned, fishing is one of the outstanding 
economic activities, followed by petro-
leum extraction. All other commodities, 
in general, run in a lower scale of value, 
if military and paramilitary expenses are 
excluded. 
The importance of fishing for human 
nourishment is well known, especially in 
relation to the population explosion. 
Fifty percent of the current world's 
inhabitants have a protein deficiency. 
Fish protein compares in protein con-
tent to that of meat, eggs, or milk. Also, 
the unsaturated fats of fish oils have 
dietary advantages.2 If the lack of pro-
tein is critical now, the possibilities of 
malnutrition in the future, unless tre-
mendous technical developments in 
farming on land are achieved, will be 
huge. Theoretical studies indicate the 
production capacity of animal protein 
from the seas could be large cnough to 
satisfy the diet of 30 billion people.3 
Estimates, based on studies off 
southern California, indicate that the 
production of zooplankton is 7.5 per-
cent of thc total phytoplankton prodll(:-
tion and that fish, sea mammals, and 
benthic animals reach only 3.4 percent 
of the total phytoplankton produe-
tion.4 Therefore, one solution for more 
efficient use of food from the sea would' 
be to shorten the feeding chain, trying 
to make phytoplankton or zooplankton 
edible for humans. To illustrate, 1,000 
grams of phytoplankton convert into 
100 grams of copepods. This, in turn, 
means 10 grams of herring, implying 
finally one gram for man.5 The Russians 
were experimenting with krill as a food 
for man. Other possible uses arc as food 
for dOJllct-ltic lind ollu:r IIninlllk6 
Continental Shclvcs arc thc areas of 
most productive fishing. Almost 80 per-
cent of the world catch comes from 
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those areas and nearby zones.7 The 
Continental Shelves of the Northern 
Hemisphere are about three times the 
area of the Southern Hemisphere Conti-
nental Shelf areas, and top production 
has been reached. I-Ience, the shelf areas 
of the "oceanic hemisphere" will be-
come more important in future efforts 
to increase the world catch of fish. It is 
interesting to note the most spectacular 
jump in fish catch made by Peru is 
precisely in the area of the Continental 
Shelf, in regions benefited by con-
venient currents and nutrients. This 
brings forth the question of the future 
possibilities of increasing the world 
catch through pelagic fishing. For a 
better catch, equipment will have to be 
improvcd.8 It is reasonable to cxpect 
that Continental Shelves will keep their 
importance as the main fishing grounds. 
Therefore, we can forecast a pressure 
towards research and exploratory fish-
ing in the probably fertile areas of the 
Southern Hemisphere. This will require 
the development of large new fishing 
fleets with the capability of proccssing 
their catchcs through factory mother 
ships. The Russians already showed this 
trend in their opcration in the Argcntine 
Continental Shelf in the last few years. 
As was mentioned, the coastal areas 
of the less devcloped countries will he 
the new grounds for fishing. Thos~ 
countries generally lack the means re-
quired for the best methods and they 
will be, therefore, out of competition. 
We can foresee that those activities may 
generate areas of conflict. The maladies 
of probable overfishing in those regions 
is a real danger. Consequences of over-
fishing have been proven with the 
forced interruptions of World Wars I 
and II in Europe9 and in the halibut 
fishing in the northeastern Pacific and 
on the Grand Banks.10 That fear is the 
cause of disagreement in the current 
juridical status of soVt'rt'ignty on Conti-
Ilt'ntal Shrives legislated unilatcrally by 
different eouJltries. 
Current exploitation of minerals at 
sea, eompared with the potential, is 
meager. The reasons for the small-scalc 
cxploitation includc a lack of con-
venient information, lack of appropriate 
technology, and a nonurgent need to 
resort to that source of minerals. 11 A 
good proof of the last is the case of 
pctroleum exploitation. Even offshore 
mining of that material, which started in 
1899, developed only after World War 
II. In a period of 10 years, ending in 
1967, offshore oil production reached 
16 percent of the tolal world produc-
tion.12 In the United Slales alone, 
offshore natural gas production reached 
977 billion cubic feet. 13 Offshore oil 
production of the United Slates equals 
that of the rest of the world, with the 
Persian Gulf accounting for 75 pcrcent 
of the ,production outside the Uniled 
States. 1 The potential oil exploitation 
in the North Sea is well revealed by the 
interest shown in lhe 5-year exploration 
period begun by 23 groups of different 
oil companies. The possibilities of natu-
ral gas supplies discovered in the same 
area seem to be able to rcpluce the coal 
gas used in the area within the next 20 
years.1S 
Eslimates of reserves for the next 10 
years indicate that offshore oil produc-
tion will account for 40 percent of the 
world's extraction. 1';stimall'H [01' the 
Arctic Conlinental Shelf in the'i'yumen 
region show that by 1980 oil produc-
tion thcre will equal thc current produc-
tion of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics.16 Other shelf areas of the 
world in the Southern Hemisphere seem 
ready to start offshore oil exploitation 
on a large scale. In some places close to 
the coast, offshore exploitation began in 
1932.17 Other estimates by W.E. Pratt 
(1951) indicate Continental Shclf oil 
reserves are approximately 1,000 billion 
harrels, equaling oil reserves of conti-
JlI'nlai areas. 18 
Rights to PI!troit'lIm I'xpillitntillll 
from lhe shdf are dl':lrly defincd in the 
last Geneva Convention already dis-
cussed. The convcntion assures benefits 
for the coastal statc. A nation's profit, 
however, wiJI depend upon its tech-
nology and the feasihility of extraction. 
i\lining and extractive activitics from 
the Continental Shelves can be divided 
into two categories: exploiting the 
riches of the soil and subsoil and extrac-
tion of minerals and salts from the sea 
water, whieh ineludes the conversion of 
salt water into fresh water. We shall 
discuss at more length the first type of 
exploitation, since extraction of s,"llts 
and minerals is casily accomplished 
from territorial waters. Though we shall 
mention mining operations, some of 
them are done also in the beachcs. 
Continental Shelves are about 20 
percent of the continental lands. As the 
rocks of Continental Shelves do not 
differ basically from rocks on land, one 
can expect the same average mineral 
potential in those submarine soils. On 
beaches, due to the mechanical forces of 
the ocean surf, mining and processing 
arc relatively simple. The sea level varia-
tions of the Pleistocene age, during 
presumed stabilization periods, give 
good mining possibilities for old off-
shore beaches, now submerged.! 9 
Glauconite, a possihlc source of 
potassium, is found in various offshore 
locations. Phosphorite is found' off Peru, 
l\lexico, Chile, the Unit(!d States, Argen-
tina, Japan, South Africa, and certain 
submerged areas off islands in the 
Indian Ocean. Tin is found in drowned 
river valleys offshore in Thailand and 
Indonesia. Also in drowned river valleys 
are deposits of gold, platinum, and 
diamonds. Some of those areas arc off 
Nome and Good News Bay in Alaska 
and the Orange River in South-West 
Africa.2o 
Iron ore and coal have been mined 
from the subsea floor for a long time, 
but the mines were entered from the 
coast, as is donc in England, .I apan, 
Newfoundland, iII111 1"inland,21 Sulphur 
is also found in the caps of salt dOlllcs. 
Large concentrations of those domes 
have been surveyed in the offshore areas 
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of the Gulf of Mcxico. Also, in the Gulf 
of Mexico, as well as offshore Iceland, 
notable calcareolls shell d(!posits exist, 
used as raw material for the manufac-
hire of portland cement. From the 
offshore areas of eastern Texas alone, 
45 million tons of shells have been 
obtained in the last 20 years.22 Also, 
there are deposits of magnetite, colum-
bite, ilmenite, zircon, rutile, monazite, 
and silica in different areas of the 
world.23 
Extraction from sea water of salts 
and minerals with concentrations 
smaller than those of boron is not 
economical, using current methods. Of 
some of those economically feasible to 
exploit, offshore minerals for which 
there arc adequate land reserves arc not 
practically extracted. However, magne-
sium, sodium chloride, potassium com-
pounds, bromine, and chemicals used in 
the manufacture of gypsum are ob-
tained from sea water, mostly in the 
United States.24 
Extraction of fresh water from salt 
water has been performed only in 
limited coastal areas due to its high cost. 
Therefore, we shall not discuss that 
activity. We also shall leave aside the 
possibilities of using the physical phe-
nomena of the ocean as a source of 
energy, which, except in one case, is in 
the project stage and of strict coastal 
interest.25 
Seaweed is farmed mostly iii terri-
torial waters, though it could be har-
vested in some areas outside of those. 
Seaweed is economically important and 
can have several uses: food for men and 
cattle and as a source of iodine, potash, 
alginic acids, a1ginates, agar-agar, and 
fertilizer.26 
Comparing future possibilities to the 
reality of Continental Shelf mining, it is 
worth noting a recent I-year study was 
conducted hy Economic Af;Sociates, 
I ne., with support of Oe(!an 111111 Engi-
neering, Inc. and some University of 
Maryland consultants. The st~dy aims 
primarily at nonliving resources on the 
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u.s. shelves. The published conclusion 
states that of the 50 materials existing 
on the shelves, only a handful are vital 
for the U.S. economy in case of short-
age or price rise. Oil and gas are men-
tioned as worthwhile mining resources. 
Recommendations of the report empha-
size the need for more comprehensive 
studies of the U.S. continental mar-
gins.27 
Such a declaration by a major user of 
natural resources in the most advanced 
economy is worthy of special considera-
tion. However, it is dangerous to gen-
eralize, since the land resources in the 
United States are seldom found in other 
countries. Also, it is worth considering 
that exploitation of mineral resources at 
sea, even at moderate depths, requires a 
solid technology; therefore, in most 
cases, advanced countries will play an 
active role in seabed exploitation wher-
ever it is done. Moreover, a detailed 
scientific knowledge of the areas of 
Continental Shelves intended for exploi-
tation is essential. 
IV-MARINE TECHNOLOGY: 
ITS CURRENT POSSIBILITIES 
ON CONTINENTAL SHELVES 
Operations on the Continental 
Shelves, as well as on the decp sca 
bottom, depend on oceanographic 
knowledge, engineering techniques, and 
an understanding of man's physiology. 1 
Development of new materials, reliable 
and resistant to tremendous pressures, 
although light, implies great progress in 
the capability for deep sea operation. It 
is easily understandable that the attain-
ment of that commitment will involve-
and has involved-multiple technology 
proficiency. 
After the Truman proelamation, 
activities and technology interacted in a 
continuous and more intense ye;trly 
trend. All thosc activities have becn 
directed usually towards: (a) increas-
ingly deeper and freer individual human 
operations in tIle sea;2 (b) development 
of more versatile vehicles capable of 
reaching deeper ranges, of manned, 
unmanned, and robot forms;3 and (e) 
development of techniques for direct 
and indirect knowledge of the sea and 
its boundaries.4 
The development of the aqualung by 
Jacques Yves Cousteau in 1943 was a 
milestone for future progress in the 
exploration of Continental Shelves. The 
Krasberg lung with a controlled amount 
of oxygen and the use of a closed 
breathing system of a helium and oxy-
gen atmosphere was another important 
advance for reaching increasing depths 
in diving.5 Other major steps were 
established through operations "Conti-
nental Shelves," "Sealab," and the 
project "Man-in-the-Sea." The first 
operation began in 1962 and proved the 
ability of man to live and work for long 
periods of time in the sea. Those first 
trials were surpassed by the achieve-
ments of Sealabs I and II. New shelters 
were tested, longer numbers of days and 
men were involved, and flexible struc-
tures like the SPlD (Submersible Port-
able In(latable Dwelling) were tried 
successfully.6 Experiences of Sealab II 
showed aquanauts were able to stay 15 
to 30 days continuously under 205 feet 
of water.7 Scalah III, scheduled for tllll 
autumn of 1968, planned t~ advance 
the previous experiments in the field of 
oceanography, engineering, salvage and 
construction, biology, and use of 
trained mammals for helping aqua-
nauts.8 Unfortunately the death of one 
of the aquanauts, Mr. Berry L. Gannon, 
the cause of which was not clear, 
interrupted the experiment.9 
A group of divers from California, 
working with specially designed gear, 
were able to perform tasks at 600 feet. 
Another system, the "Cachalot," de-
veloped by \V eSlinghouse, al\ows un-
interrupted diving and living in a high-
pressure atmosphere of oxygen-helium-
nitrogen. With that system, longer 
periods of useful operation, greater 
safety, and savings of time are ob-
tained.1o 
~'Bathysphere," "benthoseope," 
"bathyscaph" and "Trieste" are pio-
neers in reaching great depths. Sinee 23 
January 1960, when the last reached 
35,800 feet in the deepest part of the 
Marianas Treneh, several submersibles 
have been launched. After the diving 
saucers created by Cousteau, other in-
ventors increased the capabilities of 
earlier vehieles. Among those, we can 
mention "Deep Qucst," which is 40 feet 
long and carries 7,000 pounds of equip-
mcnt for special use for prospecting for 
minerals on Continental Shelves. The 
PX-15, because of its capabilitie; of 
floating freely, is of special value for 
biological and acoustical observa-
tions. 11 
Besidcs specific oceanographic instru-
mcntation, photography, television, 
seismic refraction and reflection, sound 
transmission. and magnctometry have 
been powerful means for extending 
man's knowledge of the bottom of the 
Continental Shelves. Submarine photog-
raphy was attempted in 1895 by Bou-
tan, but it took several years before the 
proper lighting and gear were ob-
tained.12 Underwater television com-
bincd with sonar and lifting gear as-
semhled in special devices like CU It V 
(Cable Controlled Underwater Recovery 
Vehiele) is able to locate and recover 
objects from the bottom, such as the 
hydrogen bomb lost at Palomares, 
Spain. Some underwater television 
systems, like the one developed by the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, can work 
at 1,000 feet and obtain elear ima~es 
with as little light as one foot-candle. 3 
Present capabilities to deploy instru-
ments and equipment in floating or 
fixed platforms required long ycars of 
engincering cxperience. Now, large 
buoys likc the Nomad c:m he S:lfdy 
nnchorcd in the tll'l'P ol'cnn. Also plnt-
forms, eSRenlinl for drilling offshore, 
have grown considernhly in size. The 
state of the art ,that allowed, until only 
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recently, 200 feet as a maximum depth 
of extraction began to make further 
progress with different modes of opera-
tion. Since 1963 the introduction of 
floating platforms permitted hopes of 
not only greater exploitable depths but 
reduced costs and gave greater mobility 
and better seaworthiness.14 In 1967 a 
huge floating platform built in the 
United States and towed to Africa 
began to operate in 300 fect of water. 
The Submarex, a converted patrol ship, 
could drill in 1,500 feet of water. 
Records of a 242 foot barge, the Blue 
Water, showed an aptitude for with-
standing waves of 28 feet and winds of 
65 miles per hour without suspending 
drilling operations.1 5 
The mining of most minerals from 
the sea is not as advanced as the 
techniques for the exploitation of oil. 
Hydraulic or bucket dredge is used for 
most mincrals.16 The situation has 
changed with new Deep Submersible 
Vehieles (DSV) like the Quest and the 
abilities of man to dive to llte bottom of 
Continental Shelves. 
The high reliability of automatic 
systems and the natural adwntnges of 
the Continental Shelf seem ~o open 
wide hopes for the installation of nu-
c1enr plants on the senbed. The nlmost 
infinite radiation shield and infinite 
isothermal sink, a naturally pressurized 
environment, and isolation in the event 
of disaster are the main advantages of 
that location, In that case, Continental 
Shelves adjacent to populated areas 
would be suitable "service areas. ,,1 7 
The above review has shown that the 
progress of technology allows 11S small-
scale operations to all depths of almost 
all Continental Shelves. The feasibility 
of enlarging that potential depcnds on 
industrial developmcnts such as super-
strength plastics, ~)owcr pncknges, deep 
mooring uevicl's,1 hl~tter knowledge of 
the composition and soil mechanics of 
the holtom floors, better structure 
foundations,1 9 and tests on the apti-
tude of man to withstand high-pressured 
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special atmosphercs.2 0 The success of 
operating automatic systems is also of 
major importance for special tasks 
where man cannot be exposed. It is also 
clear that any of those operations will 
require high technological standards, 
expensive devices, and big groups of 
qualified personnel able to work as 
teams. Therefore, this sort of operation 
will be restricted in the immediate 





Land bases have been and probably 
will continue to be the main support for 
naval forces. Navies must cross Conti-
nental Shclves where much effort has 
been put into offensive and defensive 
weapon systems which have greatly 
changed with time. Before the develop-
ment of the submarine, coastal bat-
teries, rudimentary mines, and naval 
forces were the main threats to other 
naval forces transiting the Continental 
Shelves. Submarines and aviation have 
changed the scene. Developments in 
mine devices converted the shelves into 
areas of greater danger before World 
War I, but achievements in underwater 
vehicles and techniques have ereated 11 
revolution since World War II. 
To estimate the new possibilities 
open, it is convenient to focus the 
discussion on mobility, weapons opera-
tions, and related problems. 
Nuclear submarines led to opera-
tional capabilities difficult to conceive 
before the 1950's. Currently they can 
reach the maximum depths of the Con-
tinental Shelves, manoeuver at very high 
speeds, l and operate for long periods of 
time. Special submersible vehicles can 
also reach all depths of Contincnt;11 
Shelves, with limited purposes. A mili-
tary submarine, the USS Dolphin, 
launched on 8 June 1968 and opera-
tional now, represents a new asset in the 
deep submergence submarine vehicles 
list. Her research equipment weighs 
more than 12 tons, and she has more 
sonar devices than any other submarine. 
The Dolphin is engaged in classified 
research, and her capabilities are cur-
rently evaluated.2 With the latest ex-
periences of the Man-in-the·Sea Project, 
the mobility of man himself on the 
bottom of the shelves has been tested. 
That implies the possibility of laying 
implements on the bottom of the 
shelves and attending them or per-
forming other tasks. Manipulation 
capabilities of special vehicles, manned 
or unmanned, have been provided and 
improved, as has the knowledge of 
divers, whieh can be combined with a 
great uplifting power, i.e., with "Hardi-
man" (Human Augmentation Research 
and Development Investigation).3 
Deployment of weapon systems on 
the Continental Shelves and in the 
superjacent waters can encompass plant-
ing of mines, establishing of static 
Suhroc launchers, establishing fixed or 
mobile ballistic missile launching plat-
forms, operation of guided underwater 
systcms, and conventional operations in 
antisubmarine warfare. 
The feasibility of placing fixed or 
mobile weapons systems on the bottom 
depcnds heavily on the nature of hoth 
the bottom and the structure. Knowl-
edge of soil mechanics is important. The 
U.S. Bureau of Docks has been con-
ducting studies of deep ocean installa-
tions. One author, a participant in those 
studies, concludes that loads up to 
10,000 pounds can be placed with 
current techniques,4 but undoubtedly 
the knowledge of the constitution of 
the boLtom is essential.s Areas of loosc 
sediment, and especially ooze, will be 
difficult or inconvenient zones, even for 
landing suhmersible vehicles, and could 
;Jct us traps.6 I3csides knowh'd~c of the 
soil mcl'il:lIIics, a dl'luilt'(1 surv('y of tIll' 
relief of the bottom will be importunt 
for picking out possible emplacement 
sites. 
The manned operation of those sta-
tions will be closely linked to develop-
ments in power packages and in re-
supply facilities. The importance of 
both features is evident; the lesser the 
frequency of visits to those stations the 
better will be their secrecy of location. 
The loss oC concealment is a serious 
detriment for an underwater offensive-
defensive system, and the discovery of 
an offensive system installed on the 
enemy's Continental Shelf implies its 
almost sure destruction. 
Some people envh;age the fruits of 
current experiences like Sealab as the 
foundation for more ambitious projects 
of underwater nuclear submarine bases. 
They would make it possible to service, 
to resupply, and to change crews for 
military submarines without having 
them surface or go back to their land 
bases so frequently.7 Although to dis-
euss this seems premature, it is worth 
while to note the concern about the use 
of seamounts for that and other pur-
poses.s 
One way to improve the concealment 
of underwater missile stations is to place 
them underground. If engineers could 
afford this type of construction, at least 
at the depths of the Continental 
Shelves, the tllsk of identifying and 
locating them would be considerably 
more difficult than for stations resting 
on the boltom.9 
The use of underwater missile sta-
tions for defensive operations against 
submarines or surface forces does not 
seem to be practical. The advantage of 
mobility, if the first firing is not a kill, is 
missing. The system is expensive and for 
attacking surface forces can be substi-
tuted with other mobile weapon sys-
tems. Regarding submarine counter-
attacks, a combination of guided sys-
tems with surface and submarine ships 
seems to he more advanlageous. 
Usually all defensive systems put up 
on the shclves will need systems for 
detection and classification, except 
those weapon systems functioning 
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under the specified premise of auto-
matie firing. For the purpose of detec-
tion, the Continental Shelf will provide 
a lengthened warning analogous to that 
obtained by the DEW line. Advantages 
gained through the SOFAR studies,!O 
transducers able to perform reliably at 
great pressures, 11 and methods of anti-
submarine warfare environmental pre-
dietion! 2 let us conceive of outer shelf 
detection systems that could efficiently 
alert us of possible intruders on the 
Continental Shelf. 
The use of previously described 
means would imply new demands o.n 
geophysical detailed surveys of the Con-
tinental Shelves where operations are 
planned, especially navigation aids and 
efficient underwater communieations 
systems. 
VI-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS: 
FORMER FACTORS IN THEIR 
GLOBAL INTERACTION AND 
THE PROJECTION OF FORCE 
FROM THE SEA 
We have seen how the riches of the 
Continental Shelves are open to exploi-
tation and also how those zones are 
useful for military applications. Both 
features widen the spectrum of possible 
conflicts, frictions, and areas of possihlll 
dispute in war. Economie incentives and 
economic objectives are essential for 
nations' progress. The protection and 
expansion of those objectives include an 
important body of peacetime strategies. 
Our world does not have true peace, and 
the opposition of two major blocs is 
forcing a deployment of military means 
through strategies that look for favor-
able relative positions. The areas under 
study fall within two main spheres of 
action: economy and war. Therefore, 
their connections with politics and a 
recourse to force have to be looked for 
in hoth fields. 
The current economic importance of 
the shelves can be summarized in their 
riches as world fishing grounds and 
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sources for petroleum exploitation and 
mineral extraction. Of those activities, 
the first two are of paramount impor-
tance. Mineral extraction will increase if 
economic incentives or want of impor-
tant materials surpasses the current 
technological and economic drawbacks. 
But the need for those materials is easy 
to conceive if man continues in a 
"dispendious mood" (extravagant and 
wasteful) regarding natural resources. It 
can be argued that intensive extraction 
has stimulated new developments and 
that substitutes havc been found in the 
history of economic and industrial 
development. Anyway, that optimistic 
theory that rests on unlimited possibili-
ties, although hopeful, is not always 
real. The highly industrialized countries, 
unless the trend is changed, will be the 
ones most in need of those sea reserves. 
Legal possession of soil and subsoil 
Continental Shelf riches is clearly de-
fined by the Geneva Convention, in 
spite of its imperfections. However, the 
entitlement to those riches does not 
mean the feasibility of direct exploita-
tion, since the ability to exploit is 
limited to less than a handful of coun-
tries. Exploitation is always possihle, 
using another's techniques through con-
tracts or concessions, with some of the 
benefits, wishes, and interest of hilateral 
or multilateral parties involved, cveil 
though these might not always coincide. 
On that occasion, indirect pressures or 
political actions, the pursuing of one's 
national interests, could give place to 
frictions or conflicts of different magni-
tude. Those conflicts will usually en-
compass one or more countries of a 
well-developed stage and one of those in 
the developing stage, most frequently 
the legal owner of the prospected riches. 
Exploitation is generally preceded by 
the exact knowledge of what is worth 
exploiting. Previous surveys are always 
necessary to assure success. Prospecting 
is an expensive activity and requires in 
its exploratory phases a great deal of 
scientific and .teehnieal skills. In these 
cases the pattern of conflict between 
the possible explorers and owners of the 
shelves is repeated. Differences or con-
flicts regarding knowledge of another's 
Continental Shelf can well precede 
other conflicts. It is worth noting that 
scientific enterprises can cover, at times, 
some of those operations. Article 5.8 of 
the Geneva Convention on Continental 
Shelves states: 
Nevertheless the coastal state 
shall not normally withhold its 
consent if the request to research 
is submitted by a qualified institu-
tion with a view to purely scien-
tific research into the physical or 
biological characteristics of the 
continental shelf suhject to the 
proviso that the coastal state shall 
have the right, if it so desires, to 
participate or to be represented in 
the research and that in any event 
the results shall be published. 1 
That restriction of rights is made 
with the open intention of preventing a 
state from hampering the development 
of scientific knowledge. On the other 
hand, how can one he assured that 
scientific data is to be used only for 
scientific purposes and that the pub-
lished resulLs arc the only rl:sulls? That 
does not hal'[H:n in marine n!Hl!areh at 
least. Although the participation of the 
coastal country is afforded in the con-
vention, great disparity of technological 
levels cannot assure that the supervision 
is effective. 
Therefore, we can conclude that 
when thc exploitation of the resources 
of the Continental Shclves would in-
volve high interests and the resources 
would not appertain to the advanced 
countries making thc exploitation itself, 
frictions and conflicts-natural or pro-
voked-might be abundant. 
Although conflicts arc possible, more 
immediately important are conflicts on 
the Continental Shclves involving fishing 
activities. Several examples in the past 
showed that in those cases not only 
political, hut military, action has been 
used as a means of enforcing a deter-
mined course of action. The difficulty 
in a successful definition of the area of 
exclusive fishing rights is another proof 
of the clash of national interests.2 
Fishing is the oldest sea resource ex-
ploited and also of the most impor-
tance. It is then natural that this field 
contains the largest record of frictions. 
Again, technology and economic 
development prcscnt opposing interests 
for devcloped and devcloping countries. 
The superpowers and big fishing nations 
want no territorial restrictions heyond a 
narrow fringe of coastal waters. Mean· 
while, the smaller and less·developed 
powers look for wide margins of exclu-
sive fishing rights. The Soviet Union, 
due to security reasons, docs not share 
the opinion of the United States.3 
Tlw amhiguity of the Geneva Con-
vention regarding sedenta?, species, 
mentioned in article 2A, brought 
about other conflicts, due to its inter-
pretation, such as the one between 
Bra;~il and Franee.s 
The effects of overfishing in tradi· 
tional areas and the desire to increase 
the catch make countries with growing 
economics or those depending on fish-
ing to direct their eyes towards new 
areas. Continental Shelves and slopes of 
remote places arc suitable places for 
fishing when adequate fishing fleets and 
techniques arc availahle. In that posi· 
tion, the freedom to fish in the most 
profitable regions is a logical policy to 
sustain. The less·developed countries, 
which lack modern techniques, empha-
size the danger of overfishing and the 
need for conservation of the natural 
resources in front of their coasts. In 
some countries, for example, the 
balance of fishing captures has impliea-
tiow; for otlH'r inllu:;tril':; :meh m; th(' 
gUllno inllll::try in p('ru. 
'I'll<' lIl'l'tI for gn'lIter lInimal protein 
would justify operations thllt arc also 
economically advlmtageous. Also, para-
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doxically, most of those starving nations 
arc in front of the sea with good 
prospects of abundant fish, but they 
lack the human and material resources 
to make fishing operations economically 
successful. 
Looking at the subject from the 
other side, is it illogical not to harvest 
the seas where fishing is convenient? 
That is a waste of resources offered by 
nature. That harvest will fulfill its cycle 
of life anyhow. The key is really to 
determine the correct levcl of the catch 
and how to make sure that that levcl is 
respected. For that, a good knowledge 
of population dynamics is essential, and, 
in most cases, for the probably new 
fishing grounds those studies are 
missing. 
Solutions to these situations could be 
sought through multilateral, bilateral, or 
unilateral means. Multilateral efforts 
have not always been successful. Uni-
lateral enforcement usually leads to 
naval action as a means of enforcing the 
regulations on intruders.6 Previously it 
was pointed out the probable difference 
in power among prospective litigants 
regarding sea exploitation conflicts; 
therefore, enforcement of unilateral 
declarations of exclusive rights very 
frequently, if preceded hy a naval 
action, would be followed hy politi<:111 
action in one of the several international 
forums or in the United Nations. Con-
ciliation of opposing interests cannot be 
e~sily seen at the present unless enforce-
ment is found through multilateral 
agreement on the basis of mutual con-
veniences. Those agreements will not he 
easily carried out. Therefore, Conti-
nental Shelf waters would be areas of 
intense naval deployment and patrolling 
by some countries. 
Partial or large damage to a country's 
economy done by overfishing in its 
('oa~lal W:lII'1"$ dl'(H'III(:: upon th(' (''(ll'nt 
111O~1' walc'l'~ lire 1I~1'(1 1111 fillhing grountlll 
:lnd to the imporl:lllcl~ of fishing to its 
economy. The magnitude of the opera-
tions and the period for which they 
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have to be sustained would depend on 
specific situations. This cold war opera-
tion is feasible in a tense world. To be 
ignorant of what is happening and to 
resort to political or military wnys of 
cOllnteraction for a rclatively exLended 
period of time diminishes the expec-
tnney of this conflict. In any ca~e, 
knowledge of the resources and their 
natural dynamics and reconnaissance 
through naval or other paramilitary 
units would be some of the means of 
assuring some validity to claims towards 
pretended "aggressors." 
In spite of the previously mentioned 
conflicts involving the Continental Shclf 
areas, naval hostilities of a cold or hot 
war will provide the broadest use of 
them. The two major political and 
military blocs of the world show a 
different dependence on sea operations. 
The free world counts on the unre-
sLricted use of the sea for transportation 
of goods and mcn. The Communist 
world, on the other hand, has a growing 
interest in the sea as a means of de-
feating the enemy by annihilation of 
those streams of trade and logistics vital 
to the maritime nations. I\s a new trend 
today, the Communist nations seem to 
be aware of the economic benefits of 
controlling the sea through shipping and 
new courses of action which shape what 
is difficult to define as merely an 
economic strategy. 7 
Within that frame a considerable 
deployment of military force at sea 
provides offensive and defensive systems 
by both blocs. Those forces keep an 
almost equal value, either in conven-
tional or nuclear war, since they par-
tially participate at length in the latter. 
The Continental Shelves, as we have 
seen, provide alternately for aggression 
and defense. However, to make their use 
feasible requircs high technology and a 
good knowledge of the areas concerned. 
For the free world, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Japan, and France 
lead in marine technology, being the 
first countries prominent in all fields of 
that technology. On the other hand, the 
Soviet Union has shown a tremendous 
increase in her capahilities and inlc:rest 
in ocean sciences. Iler buildup on an 
important research Ilel't nnd of a large 
fishing Ilel:t, which undoubtl'dly acts liM 
a simultaneous collector of data intdli· 
gl'nCI\ hlls spread Communist man tim.: 
operations worldwide. Some scientists 
speculate the Soviets arc behind the 
United States in marine science. Their 
knowlcdge of some areas, however, sllch 
as the I\rctic, is beLter. Thl're is evidence 
thllt they apply great effort to military 
oceanographic research.8 
I nformation on Soviet underwater 
experience is scarce. IIowever, we can 
presume a rising effort, since in June 
1968 an underwater laboratory, the 
"Chernomov," was being tested in the 
Black Sea. The design of that laboratory 
seems to be below the Sealab III level, 
but it is known that new underwater 
vehieles arc being developed.9 
Both major blocs have nuclear sub· 
marines capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons from ranges of about 2,500 
nautical miles for the United States lind 
an lIsslIlIled range of tj·OO nautical lIIiJ!!1:! 
for the Soviet Union. The laLLer range 
estimate is an approximation. It was 
estimated that the Soviets lag 10 years 
behind the submersible capabilities of 
the United States. Let us assume for 
both about equal ranges as well as 
comparable aptitude for underwater 
launehing.1 0 ~:ven with their respective 
differences, both weapons systems arc 
capable of inflicting tremendous damage 
to industrial complexes as well as a 
heavy number of casualties. 
Usually a Fleet Ballistic Missile Suh· 
marine (SSJ3N) will attack as far as 
possihle from the enemy shoreline and 
the horder of the Continental Shelf. 
Ilowever, the selection of inland targets 
OJ' lhl! particular Ill'eds of inercasill~ 
failure~ in the navi~alioll systems could 
oblige the attacking submarine to cross 
the Contillental Shelf. III both cases, 
dl!tl!etion of the intruder as far as 
possible is vital for his destruction be-
fore his weapons can be launched. 
The surveillance system installed on 
the Continental Shelf and comple-
mented by a deep occan system, fixed 
or mobile, would be invaluable. Such a 
surveillance system combined with a 
guided weapons system could provide 
one apt response in the short amount of 
reaction this sort of attack allows. 
Probably it is within that frame that 
projects Trident and Artemis merged11 
and the Atlantic Underwater Tactical 
Evaluation Center operations arc 
tested.12 
Other strategic shelves where the 
probable Fleet Ballistic Missile Laun-
chers exit may. provide installations of 
complementary detection systems, that 
through convenient communications 
allow better intelligence of the enemy's 
movements.13 Those systems will re-
quire considerable expense, a good level 
of secrecy for keeping the efficiency of 
the system, and a good display of 
technology . 
The use of undcrwater mobile or 
fixed platforms for offensive purposcs 
from the enemy's Continental Shelf is 
difficult to conccive as convenient. The 
advantage of such a strategic deploy-
ment could be for launching missiles or 
as a base for underwater opcrations. Thc 
first use would be elaborate, expensivc, 
and conscqucntly aimed only towards 
important objectives that cannot bc 
rcached by other means and where 
surprise is important. But there are 
serious adverse factors; primary objec-
tives usually would bc in areas of highly 
sophisticated defense systems, opera-
tions for laying the necessary devices 
will be seriously impaired at times or 
impossible to execute. The use of the 
Continental Shclf for putting up small 
underwater bases, easy to construct and 
with limited objectives, is a more 
feasible method. 
Underwater antiballistic missile sta-
tions on a shelf could imply a con-
vcnient defensive deployment for 
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destruction of multiple warhead missiles 
before the separation point. Those sta-
tions would enjoy concealment within 
the premises commented upon in the 
previous chapter. 
Continental Shelves are suitable 
grounds for mine and countermine war-
fare operations. Mobile underwater sta-
tions could operate for both types of 
actions within a reasonable radius, de-
pending on tasks, weapons, and levels of 
risks admitted. The laying of special 
weapons of large destructive force on 
detlmnined spots of thc ocean bottom is 
conceivablc with current technology. If 
those weapons can be rendered active at 
will a long time after being laid, opera-
tions in strategic areas of thc world by 
one of the major blocs in belligerence 
could achieve a military advantage and 
could be expected. Do those weapons 
exist, and have some of them already 
been deployed? Secrecy on modern 
developments make that a difficult 
question to answer with reasonable 
accuracy. 
The natural characteristic granted to 
objccts laid on the Continental Shelves, 
concealmcnt, Icd us to one of the most 
immcdiate uses of Continental Shelves, 
in the case of needing secrecy for some 
undetcrmined reasons. Thosc areas arc 
availahle for hiding weapOII!! or deviecH, 
provided surveillance of thc zone is 
possible or intruders are discarded. 
Exploitation of this course of action is 
varied and reaches different scales of 
operations, covering from peacetime 
operations to insurgeney, espionage, or 
conventional aetions. Coastal or shelf 
areas of underdeveloped countries could 
be sanctuaries for these types of opera-
tions, since their surveillance is defi-
cient. 
So far, our discussion has put us on 
the verge of utopia, at least for some 
skeptical people who havc not witnessed 
the current pace of undcrwater opcra-
tions. Unfortunately, when these mat-
ters arc discussed from a public informa-
tion vicwpoint, the elements of proof 
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are scarce. It is natural that high mili-
tary developments are subjected to a 
level of secrecy directly proportional to 
the amount of innovation that the 
weapon or development implies. Any-
way, our review of underwater activities 
can show us that progress made in this 
area lets us be suspicious that new 
possibilities in maritime warfare can 
complicate severely the currently 
known status. 
How does all that affect diffl!rent 
countries? Evidently, for conOicts of a 
small scale, the implications are not so 
large; but for large-scale conflicts the 
efforts wiII have to be redoubled since 
the three dimensional frame achieved in 
World Wars I and II has been enlarged 
considerably through the action of more 
capable sl}bmersible vehicles and a man 
less restricted on water. The Continental 
Shelves emerge \ within that scene as a 
double source of effect and conOicts-
economic and military. Both are impor-
tant factors either in peace, cold war, or 
hot war situations. Of course, the Con-
tinental Shelves of both superpowers 
and immediate areas wiII he the most 
vital areas. There, the systems of attack 
and defense wiII compete heavily. The 
surveillance of those areas appears criti-
cal, and that task will impose arduous 
work. 
The current technology and high 
interest involved in worldwide strategies 
lets us say that those uses analyzed, and 
probably other uses of the Continental 
Shelves, pose a real danger of a complex 
escalation of a cold war game on the 
continental margins. 
Since the economic side should not 
be neglected as a source of pressure and 
friction, an early agreement on a juri-
dical and more complete status of the 
bottom of the shelves, seabed, and the 
waters superjacent should prevent fur-
ther complexitics of the world's politi-
cal-military situation. l4 
To' reach that reliable status will 
involve tremendous difficulties due to 
~he differences in opinion because of 
strong national interests. The un-
restricted principle of freedom of the 
seas probably can no longer be held if 
the balance of power is to he kept in its 
current status. Even the principles of 
freedom of navigation and unimpeded 
scientific and economic research will 
have to be revised. 
In any case, the surveillance of Con-
tinental Shelves and assurance of fulfill-
ment of agreements wiII involve an 
effort impossiblels or very difficult to 
perform with current means. However, 
those coastal nations which do not or 
can not develop underwater technology 
and operational capabilities to operate 
at the levels of the Continental Shelves 
will be economically and militarily in-
ferior in the face of future changes 
affecting maritime areas. 
VII-CONCLUSIONS 
The Continental Shelves have con-
siderable natural wealth. They are im-
portant for fishing, petroleum exploita-
tion, and some mineral extraction. If 
more emphasis were put on mining 
certain matcrials, these resources of 
wealth could play an even more signifi-
cant role. 
The feasibility of operations on Con-
tinental Shelves is presently restricted to 
small-scale operations, but, with ex-
perience, the field is expanding for some 
of the most advanced countries. The 
impact of those advancements is felt in 
both economic and military fields. 
Major progress is noted, not only in 
diversity of operations, hut also in the 
accuracy and range of action of the 
whole field. The ability of man to work 
at increasingly greater depths has multi-
ple implications in that progress. 
The increase of new capabilities com-
plicates remarkably any major war in 
which the leading countries would be 
involved, sincc the military use of the 
Continental Shelves would he of great 
advantage. In general, we can say that 
new technologies are broadening the 
area of naval concern. Detection and 
surveiIIanee arc enlarged to a great 
extent through the usc of the Conti-
nental Shelves. General surveiIIanee will 
be necessary for each country's security. 
Offensive-defensive systems which can 
be installed on the Continental Shelves 
within the present state of the art or in 
the near future enlarge the spectrum of 
current strategies. Either deterrence or 
retaliation wi1l have new systems enter-
ing the stage in the near future, unless 
current trends are changed. 
The possibilities mentioned indicate 
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that early and worldwide agreement 
about the use of Continental Shelves 
and deep ocean soils would be wise. To 
reach agreements will be arduous, but 
agreements may be one means of pre-
venting an escalation of underwater 
warfare. 
Whether that aim is reached or not, 
the nations with better marine technolo-
gies, knowledge of the oceans, and 
know-how will have a great advantage in 
the strategic use of the Continental 
Shelf in war as well as for immediate 
exploitaLion of nalural resources. 
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